Week 6: Phase Estimation and the RSA Cryptosystem

COMS 4281 (Fall 2024)

- 1. Practice worksheet out, and quiz $#3$ will be out tonight.
- 2. Midterm on October 21. More details soon.

• Discrete Fourier Transform F_N is a unitary matrix mapping standard basis $\{|0\rangle, \ldots, |N-1\rangle\}$ to Fourier basis $\{|f_0\rangle, |f_1\rangle, \ldots, |f_{N-1}\rangle\}$ where

$$
|f_j\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} e^{\frac{2\pi i j k}{N}} |k\rangle.
$$

• The Quantum Fourier Transform is a fast quantum **algorithm** that implements the DFT F_N for $N = 2^n$, and runs in time $\text{poly}(n) = \text{poly}(\log N)$.

[Brief linear algebra review](#page-3-0)

If $M\in \mathbb{C}^{N\times N}$ is a matrix, $\ket{\psi}\in \mathbb{C}^N$ is a vector, and $\lambda\in \mathbb{C}$ satisfying

$$
M|\psi\rangle = \lambda |\psi\rangle
$$

then we say that $|\psi\rangle$ is an **eigenvector** of M with **eigenvalue** λ .

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$$

On the other hand,

 $(\lambda^* \langle \psi |)(\lambda | \psi \rangle) = (\langle \psi | U^{\dagger})(U | \psi \rangle) = \langle \psi | U^{\dagger} U | \psi \rangle = \langle \psi | \psi \rangle = 1$

because $U^{\dagger}U = I$ (one of definitions of being unitary).

Proof continued: Therefore

$$
|\lambda|^2=1
$$

and the only such λ 's possible are of the form $e^{2\pi i \theta}$.

$$
Z = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}
$$

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$$

We see that

$$
Z |0\rangle = |0\rangle \qquad Z = |1\rangle = - |1\rangle \ .
$$

Therefore standard basis are the eigenvectors and ± 1 are corresponding eigenvalues.

$$
X = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} .
$$

$$
X = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}
$$

.

We can compute this by hand, or we can also remember that

$$
X |+\rangle = |+\rangle \qquad X |-\rangle = - |-\rangle
$$

so the Hadamard basis are the eigenvectors and ± 1 are the corresponding eigenvalues.

$$
CNOT = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & & & \\ 0 & 1 & & & \\ & & 0 & 1 & \\ & & & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}.
$$

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$$

- 1. $|0, 0\rangle$ with eigenvalue 1
- 2. $|0, 1\rangle$ with eigenvalue 1
- 3. $|1, +\rangle$ with eigenvalue 1
- 4. $|1, -\rangle$ with eigenvalue -1

[Phase Estimation Algorithm](#page-16-0)

Phase Estimation Algorithm (PEA) is one of the most important subroutines in quantum computing.

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Goal of PEA:

- Ability to run controlled versions of U^k for $k = 1, 2, \ldots$
- An eigenstate $|\psi\rangle$ where $U|\psi\rangle = e^{2\pi i \theta} |\psi\rangle$,

estimate θ.

Question: The eigenvalue $e^{2\pi i \theta}$ looks like a global phase... how can you possibly estimate it?

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Answer: It becomes a relative phase once you run the controlled- U gate in superposition:

$$
cU \ket{+} \ket{\psi} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\ket{0} \ket{\psi} + \ket{1} U \ket{\psi})
$$

$$
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\ket{0} \ket{\psi} + e^{2\pi i \theta} \ket{1} \ket{\psi})
$$

$$
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\ket{0} + e^{2\pi i \theta} \ket{1}) \ket{\psi}
$$

Assume for simplicity that θ can be represented using exactly t bits. In other words the binary representation of θ looks like

$$
\theta = 0. \theta_1 \theta_2 \cdots \theta_t
$$

where $\theta_1, \theta_2, \ldots \in \{0, 1\}$. This is equivalent to

$$
\theta = \frac{\theta_1}{2} + \frac{\theta_2}{2^2} + \dots + \frac{\theta_t}{2^t}.
$$

Phase Estimation Algorithm

Measuring the first t qubits will yield $(\theta_1, \theta_2, \dots, \theta_t)$.

Let's analyze a special case where $t=2$, and $\theta=\frac{\theta_1}{2}+\frac{\theta_2}{4}$ for $\theta_1, \theta_2 \in \{0, 1\}.$ (On the board...)

Question: What if the phase θ cannot be exactly expressed as t bits?

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Answer: If we use $t + k$ ancilla qubits, and measure only the first t ancilla qubits, we will get the best t-bit approximation $\widetilde{\theta}$ of θ with probability $1-2^{-k}$.

Question: What happens if $|\psi\rangle$ is not an eigenvector of U?

Question: What happens if $|\psi\rangle$ is not an eigenvector of U? **Answer**: The set $\{|\phi_j\rangle\}$ of eigenvectors of U forms a basis for \mathbb{C}^{2^n} (if U is n-qubit unitary). We can write $|\psi\rangle$ as

$$
|\psi\rangle = \sum_j \alpha_j |\phi_j\rangle
$$

for some coefficients $\alpha_j.$

Running Phase Estimation on $|\psi\rangle$ with ancilla qubits $|0 \cdots 0\rangle$ yields a state that is close to

$$
\approx \sum_j \alpha_j \ket{\phi_j} \otimes \ket{\widetilde{\theta}_j}
$$

where θ_j is an approximation of the eigenphase θ_j , i.e. $U |\phi_j\rangle = e^{2\pi i \theta_j} |\phi_j\rangle.$

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Measuring the last register yields $\hat{\theta}_j$ with probability $|\alpha_j|^2$.

[RSA and the Factoring problem](#page-30-0)

- Invented by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman in 1977
- Most widely deployed public-key cryptosystem
- Enables public-key encryption as well as digital signatures
- 1. Bob generates a secret-key/public-key pair (sk, pk) , and publishes pk on the internet.
- 2. Alice uses pk and her message m to create a ciphertext c which she sends to Bob.
- 3. Bob gets c , and uses sk to decode m .
- 4. The adversary sees (pk, c) , and should get no information about m.

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- 2. Pick random prime number $1 \le e \le (p-1)(q-1)$.
- 3. Compute integer d where $ed = 1 \text{ mod } (p-1)(q-1)$.
- 4. Set public key $pk = (e, N)$, and secret key $sk = d$.

Alice gets a message $1 \leq m < N$. She computes and sends $c = m^e$ mod N, and send c to Bob.

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This works because $c^d=(m^e)^d=m^{ed}$, and modulo N this equals m by Fermat's Little Theorem.

Adversary sees the public key $pk = (e, N)$ and the encrypted message (ciphertext) c.

It does not know the primes p, q , nor the secret key $sk = d$.

Adversary sees the public key $pk = (e, N)$ and the encrypted message (ciphertext) c.

It does not know the primes p, q , nor the secret key $sk = d$. If it knew the prime factorization $N = pq$ it could compute the secret key!

Input: Positive integer N.

Output: Prime factorization of N as $p_1^{a_1}p_2^{a_2}\cdots$.

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The prime factorization of N is unique by the **Fundamental** Theorem of Arithmetic.

To find a factorization of N, it suffices to be able to find some nontrivial divisor of N.

It is widely believed that Factoring is hard for classical computers. The best classical algorithm, known as the **General Number Field** Sieve, takes time roughly

$$
\exp\left(O(\log N)^{1/3}\right) .
$$

This is essentially **exponential** in the number of digits of N.

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Shor's Algorithm is also a hybrid classical-quantum algorithm.

- 1. Classical part: reduce the factoring problem to order finding.
- 2. Quantum part: solve order finding.

Input: given positive integers N, x such that

- 1. $1 \leq x \leq N$
- 2. $gcd(N, x) = 1$ (i.e. they do not have any nontrivial factors in common)

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Output: find smallest integer r such that $x^r = 1$ mod N (called the **order** of $x \mod N$.

A quantum algorithm to solve Order Finding