# Week 6: Phase Estimation and the RSA Cryptosystem

COMS 4281 (Fall 2024)

- 1. Practice worksheet out, and quiz #3 will be out tonight.
- 2. Midterm on October 21. More details soon.

Discrete Fourier Transform F<sub>N</sub> is a unitary matrix mapping standard basis {|0⟩,..., |N − 1⟩} to Fourier basis {|f<sub>0</sub>⟩, |f<sub>1</sub>⟩,..., |f<sub>N−1</sub>⟩} where

$$|f_j
angle = rac{1}{\sqrt{N}}\sum_{k=0}^{N-1}e^{rac{2\pi ijk}{N}} |k
angle \; .$$

The Quantum Fourier Transform is a fast quantum algorithm that implements the DFT F<sub>N</sub> for N = 2<sup>n</sup>, and runs in time poly(n) = poly(log N).

# Brief linear algebra review

If  $M\in\mathbb{C}^{N\times N}$  is a matrix,  $|\psi\rangle\in\mathbb{C}^N$  is a vector, and  $\lambda\in\mathbb{C}$  satisfying

$$M \left| \psi \right\rangle = \lambda \left| \psi \right\rangle$$

then we say that  $|\psi\rangle$  is an **eigenvector** of *M* with **eigenvalue**  $\lambda$ .

**Proof**: Suppose that  $U |\psi\rangle = \lambda |\psi\rangle$  for some eigenvector  $|\psi\rangle$  and some eigenvalue  $\lambda$ .

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Taking inner products of  $\lambda \left| \psi \right\rangle$  with itself, on one hand we get

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On the other hand,

 $(\lambda^* \langle \psi |) (\lambda | \psi \rangle) = (\langle \psi | U^{\dagger}) (U | \psi \rangle) = \langle \psi | U^{\dagger} U | \psi \rangle = \langle \psi | \psi \rangle = 1$ 

because  $U^{\dagger}U = I$  (one of definitions of being unitary).

Proof continued: Therefore

$$|\lambda|^2 = 1$$

and the only such  $\lambda$ 's possible are of the form  $e^{2\pi i\theta}$ .

$$Z = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$$

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We see that

$$Z \left| 0 
ight
angle = \left| 0 
ight
angle \qquad Z = \left| 1 
ight
angle = - \left| 1 
ight
angle \; .$$

Therefore standard basis are the eigenvectors and  $\pm 1$  are corresponding eigenvalues.

$$X = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

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We can compute this by hand, or we can also remember that

$$X \ket{+} = \ket{+}$$
  $X \ket{-} = - \ket{-}$ 

so the Hadamard basis are the eigenvectors and  $\pm 1$  are the corresponding eigenvalues.

$$CNOT = egin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & & & \ 0 & 1 & & & \ & & 0 & 1 & \ & & & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

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- 1.  $|0,0\rangle$  with eigenvalue 1
- 2.  $|0,1\rangle$  with eigenvalue 1
- 3.  $|1,+\rangle$  with eigenvalue 1
- 4.  $|1,-\rangle$  with eigenvalue -1

# **Phase Estimation Algorithm**

Phase Estimation Algorithm (PEA) is one of the most important subroutines in quantum computing.

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#### Goal of PEA:

- Ability to run controlled versions of  $U^k$  for k = 1, 2, ...
- An eigenstate  $|\psi\rangle$  where  $U |\psi\rangle = e^{2\pi i \theta} |\psi\rangle$ ,

estimate  $\theta$ .

**Question**: The eigenvalue  $e^{2\pi i\theta}$  looks like a global phase... how can you possibly estimate it?

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**Answer:** It becomes a **relative** phase once you run the controlled-U gate in superposition:

$$egin{aligned} cU \ket{+} \ket{\psi} &= rac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\ket{0} \ket{\psi} + \ket{1} U \ket{\psi}) \ &= rac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\ket{0} \ket{\psi} + e^{2\pi i heta} \ket{1} \ket{\psi}) \ &= rac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\ket{0} + e^{2\pi i heta} \ket{1}) \ket{\psi} \end{aligned}$$

Assume for simplicity that  $\theta$  can be represented using exactly t bits. In other words the binary representation of  $\theta$  looks like

$$\theta = 0.\theta_1 \theta_2 \cdots \theta_t$$

where  $\theta_1, \theta_2, \ldots \in \{0, 1\}$ . This is equivalent to

$$\theta = \frac{\theta_1}{2} + \frac{\theta_2}{2^2} + \dots + \frac{\theta_t}{2^t}.$$

# **Phase Estimation Algorithm**



Measuring the first *t* qubits will yield  $|\theta_1, \theta_2, \ldots, \theta_t\rangle$ .

Let's analyze a special case where t = 2, and  $\theta = \frac{\theta_1}{2} + \frac{\theta_2}{4}$  for  $\theta_1, \theta_2 \in \{0, 1\}$ . (On the board...)

# **Question**: What if the phase $\theta$ cannot be exactly expressed as t bits?

**Question**: What if the phase  $\theta$  cannot be exactly expressed as t bits?

**Answer**: If we use t + k ancilla qubits, and measure only the first t ancilla qubits, we will get the best t-bit approximation  $\tilde{\theta}$  of  $\theta$  with probability  $1 - 2^{-k}$ .

## **Question**: What happens if $|\psi\rangle$ is not an eigenvector of U?

**Question**: What happens if  $|\psi\rangle$  is not an eigenvector of *U*? **Answer**: The set  $\{|\phi_j\rangle\}$  of eigenvectors of *U* forms a basis for  $\mathbb{C}^{2^n}$  (if *U* is *n*-qubit unitary). We can write  $|\psi\rangle$  as

$$\left|\psi\right\rangle = \sum_{j} \alpha_{j} \left|\phi_{j}\right\rangle$$

for some coefficients  $\alpha_i$ .

Running Phase Estimation on  $|\psi\rangle$  with ancilla qubits  $|0\cdots0\rangle$  yields a state that is close to

$$\approx \sum_{j} \alpha_{j} \left| \phi_{j} \right\rangle \otimes \left| \widetilde{\theta}_{j} \right\rangle$$

where  $\tilde{\theta}_j$  is an approximation of the eigenphase  $\theta_j$ , i.e.  $U |\phi_j\rangle = e^{2\pi i \theta_j} |\phi_j\rangle.$  Running Phase Estimation on  $|\psi\rangle$  with ancilla qubits  $|0\cdots0\rangle$  yields a state that is close to

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where  $\tilde{\theta}_j$  is an approximation of the eigenphase  $\theta_j$ , i.e.  $U |\phi_j\rangle = e^{2\pi i \theta_j} |\phi_j\rangle.$ 

Measuring the last register yields  $\tilde{\theta}_j$  with probability  $|\alpha_j|^2$ .

# **RSA** and the Factoring problem

- Invented by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman in 1977
- Most widely deployed public-key cryptosystem
- Enables public-key encryption as well as digital signatures

- Bob generates a secret-key/public-key pair (sk, pk), and publishes pk on the internet.
- 2. Alice uses *pk* and her message *m* to create a *ciphertext c* which she sends to Bob.
- 3. Bob gets c, and uses sk to decode m.
- The adversary sees (pk, c), and should get no information about m.

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- 3. Compute integer d where  $ed = 1 \mod (p-1)(q-1)$ .
- 4. Set public key pk = (e, N), and secret key sk = d.

Alice gets a message  $1 \le m < N$ . She computes and sends  $c = m^e \mod N$ , and send c to Bob.

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This works because  $c^d = (m^e)^d = m^{ed}$ , and modulo N this equals m by Fermat's Little Theorem.

**Adversary** sees the public key pk = (e, N) and the encrypted message (ciphertext) c.

It does not know the primes p, q, nor the secret key sk = d.

**Adversary** sees the public key pk = (e, N) and the encrypted message (ciphertext) c.

It does not know the primes p, q, nor the secret key sk = d. If it knew the prime factorization N = pq it could compute the secret key! **Input**: Positive integer *N*.

**Output**: Prime factorization of N as  $p_1^{a_1}p_2^{a_2}\cdots$ .

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**Output**: Prime factorization of N as  $p_1^{a_1} p_2^{a_2} \cdots$ .

The prime factorization of N is unique by the **Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic**.

To find a factorization of N, it suffices to be able to find *some* nontrivial divisor of N.

It is widely believed that Factoring is hard for classical computers. The best classical algorithm, known as the **General Number Field Sieve**, takes time roughly

$$\exp\left(O(\log N)^{1/3}
ight)$$
 .

This is essentially **exponential** in the number of digits of N.

A quantum algorithm to solve Factoring in poly(log N) steps. Discovered by Peter Shor in 1993. He was inspired by Simon's Algorithm. A quantum algorithm to solve Factoring in poly(log N) steps. Discovered by Peter Shor in 1993. He was inspired by Simon's Algorithm.

Shor's Algorithm is also a hybrid classical-quantum algorithm.

- 1. Classical part: reduce the factoring problem to order finding.
- 2. Quantum part: solve order finding.

**Input**: given positive integers N, x such that

- 1.  $1 \le x < N$
- gcd(N,x) = 1 (i.e. they do not have any nontrivial factors in common)

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**Output**: find smallest integer r such that  $x^r = 1 \mod N$  (called the order of x mod N).

# A quantum algorithm to solve Order Finding